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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the economic crisis, state budgets have been devastated by 
substantial decreases in revenue.1  A traditional source for raising revenue is 
increased taxes, but raising taxes carries a political stigma legislators prefer to 
avoid.2  Instead of (or in addition to) raising taxes, states often seek alternative 
sources of revenue through their unclaimed property laws.3  Unclaimed 
property laws incorporate the doctrine of escheat, which entitles a state to take 
custody of property that has remained unclaimed by its owner for a designated 
period of time.4  In the past twenty years, states have expanded their escheat 
laws and increased collection efforts to capture more unclaimed property as an 
alternative source of revenue.5  An example of this trend are states’ attempts to 
capture the remaining value on gift cards, which independently are often small 
amounts but, in the aggregate, constitute a substantial sum ripe for the taking. 
For the past four years, gift cards have been the most requested winter 
holiday item.6  A 2010 survey shows that consumers planned to spend an 
average of over $145 per person on gift cards during the winter holiday season 
alone, for an estimated total of $24.78 billion.7  Figures for yearly gift card 
 
 1 See Leslie Eaton, More States Look to Raise Taxes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at A4 (“A free fall in 
tax revenue is driving more state lawmakers to turn to broad-based tax increases in a bid to close widening 
budget gaps.”). 
 2 See id. (“Raising taxes is a perilous proposition for lawmakers . . . .”). 
 3 Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment: A Bright Line Test to Slice a Shadow, 
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 173 (1995); see also, e.g., Keith M. Phaneuf, Unclaimed Properties Give State Budget a 
Holiday Boost, CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/8738/unclaimed-properties-
give-state-budget-holiday-boost (projecting $92 million in revenue from unclaimed property for 2010, likely 
turning Connecticut’s projected $18 million deficit into a surplus). 
 4 True escheat laws are limited in application to real and tangible personal property.  These laws transfer 
an absolute title to the state when the owner dies without heirs.  However, this Comment uses the term escheat 
in the context of unclaimed property laws, which entitle the state to take custody of intangible personal 
property that has remained unclaimed for a designated period of time.  The phrases escheat laws and 
unclaimed property laws are used interchangeably unless otherwise noted. 
 5 See Diann L. Smith & Matthew P. Hedstrom, Will Unclaimed Property Prove an Irresistible Well?, 
SUTHERLAND, 1 (June 4, 2009), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/9508e3c1-a85a-433c-b0cb-
0bfd8d13f054/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ded2153e-872a-4b88-9101-11dd0925870a/Article6.4.09.pdf 
(“The reality, however, is that if states change unclaimed property laws with the purpose of obtaining more 
property or obtaining the property faster, the raison d’être of those laws also becomes abandoned.”). 
 6 Press Release, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, Gift Givers Listening to Recipients as Gift Card Spending Expected 
to Rise (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id= 
1033. 
 7 NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, CONSUMER INTENTIONS AND ACTIONS SURVEY 3 (2010), available at http:// 
www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Documents&op=showlivedoc&sp_id=5703. 
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spending are upwards of $65 billion, approximately 10% of which goes 
unredeemed.8 
This Comment argues that state escheat laws should not apply to gift cards 
because the traditional justifications for escheat are inappropriate, and because 
current ambiguous and antiquated legislation deters innovation that would 
otherwise benefit consumers and retailers alike.  Gift cards also serve as an 
ideal example of the inadequacy of the current standard for identifying when a 
state has the exclusive right to escheat property.  There are perplexingly wide 
variations among state unclaimed property laws, but the gift card market is 
national and consequently requires at least some national uniform doctrine, as 
provided by federal law.  The United States Supreme Court has had multiple 
opportunities to provide a federal solution but has strictly adhered to a bright-
line general rule rather than considering the significant nuances of unclaimed 
property laws.  Instead, a federal resolution will depend on congressional 
action, as it has in the past. 
Part I of this Comment provides a background discussion of gift cards’ rise 
to prominence and their distinguishable features.  It continues by tracing the 
roots of escheat and unclaimed property laws from feudal England to modern 
American Uniform Acts.  Part II argues that unclaimed property laws should 
not apply to gift cards for at least three reasons.  First, traditional justifications 
for unclaimed property laws do not support escheat of gift cards.  Second, 
escheat of gift cards violates the derivative rights doctrine, which limits the 
rights of the state to those rights the owner was entitled to.  And third, current 
escheat laws inadequately account for recent developments in gift cards that 
yield substantive, unanticipated consequences. 
Part III follows the historical development of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning conflicting claims to unclaimed property by multiple states, 
culminating in the current dual-priority structure, as declared in Texas v. New 
Jersey.9  Under Texas, the state of the owner’s last known address has primary 
priority to the unclaimed property.10  However, if that state does not have 
legislation addressing the property in question, or if the owner’s last address is 
unknown, then a second-priority rule takes effect.11  The second-priority rule 
 
 8 See Erica Alini, Governments Grab Unused Gift Cards, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at A3. 
 9 379 U.S. 674 (1965). 
 10 Id. at 681–82. 
 11 Id. at 682. 
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asserts that the holder’s12 state of incorporation has the authority to claim the 
property, subject to satisfaction of the first-priority rule at some later time.13 
Part IV argues that the dual-priority structure is ill suited for the specific 
issues concerning gift cards because the first-priority rule will never apply 
when the owner’s identity is necessarily unknown.  Strict adherence to the 
dual-priority structure creates an inequitable windfall to a minority of states, 
such as New York and Delaware, where a disproportionate majority of 
businesses are incorporated.  At the outset, there appear to be three possible 
avenues for refining the dual-priority structure: the states, the Supreme Court, 
or Congress.  However, Congress is the only real option because the states 
would be preempted from resolving this problem, and the Supreme Court is 
unwilling to tailor its holding on a case-by-case basis.  Therefore, Part V 
argues that Congress should pass specific legislation exempting gift cards from 
unclaimed property laws.  This blanket exemption represents the best possible 
solution for a rapidly developing industry that was never intended to be 
included under unclaimed property laws. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part lays out the background of gift cards and escheat laws.  Section A 
focuses on those unique characteristics of gift cards that present difficulties for 
unclaimed property laws.  It distinguishes gift cards from other types of stored-
value cards and gift certificates.  Finally, this section highlights the benefits 
that gift cards offer consumers and retailers.  Section B traces the development 
of escheat laws from their common law roots to the development of the 
modern American Uniform Acts. 
A. Gift Cards 
Gift cards have become incredibly popular since their inception in the mid-
1990s.14  Consumers spend about $65 billion on gift cards each year, of which 
$6.8 billion goes unredeemed.15  The unredeemed value is commonly referred 
 
 12 The holder is the person or entity in possession of the property that is obligated to hold the property for 
the benefit of the owner.  See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 1(6), 8C U.L.A. 97 (2001) [hereinafter 1995 
UNIF. ACT]. 
 13 Texas, 379 U.S. at 682. 
 14 See Julia S. Cheney & Sherrie L.W. Rhine, Prepaid Cards: An Important Innovation in Financial 
Services, 52 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 370, 370 (2006). 
 15 Alini, supra note 8. 
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to as breakage.16  Gift cards are just one form of prepaid cards.  A prepaid card, 
also known as a stored-value card (SVC), is a piece of plastic resembling a 
credit card that represents value already paid to the holder and that may be 
redeemed at a later time by the owner.17  Unlike other SVCs, gift cards are 
generally redeemable for merchandise only, and the holder is rarely aware of 
the recipient’s identity.18 
Further, there is an array of gift cards with varying features.19  Generally, 
gift cards are classified under one of two categories: closed-loop cards or open-
loop cards.20  Closed-loop cards are purchased directly from the retailer for 
fixed amounts.  The accounts are directly maintained by the retailer, are 
redeemable at that particular retailer only, and constitute the bulk of gift card 
sales by number and total value.21  Examples of closed-loop cards include 
those offered by Starbucks and Best Buy.22  Conversely, open-loop cards23 are 
issued by a financial institution.  The accounts are maintained across debit or 
credit card networks and may be redeemed anywhere the supported debit or 
credit card is accepted.24  Examples of open-loop gift cards include those 
offered by American Express, Visa, and MasterCard.25  Additionally, gift cards 
in either category have various features, including the ability to reload the card 
 
 16 Phillip W. Bohl et al., Prepaid Cards and State Unclaimed Property Laws, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 23, 23 
(2007). 
 17 Mark Furletti, Prepaid Card Markets & Regulation 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards 
Center Discussion Paper No. 04-01, 2004), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2004/Prepaid_022004.pdf.  Other forms of prepaid cards include travel 
cards, payroll cards, and teen cards.  Id.  However, this Comment’s focus is limited to gift cards. 
 18 See Diane Green-Kelly, Gift Certificate and Gift Card Programs: The State Law Quagmire, 23 
FRANCHISE L.J. 211, 213 (2004).  These two traits are particularly significant and troublesome for the current 
structure of unclaimed property laws.  See infra Part II.  Although gift cards are redeemable for merchandise 
only, state unclaimed property laws convert the limited right to merchandise into a greater right to cash, but 
this violates the derivative rights doctrine by granting a greater right to the state than the owner ever possessed.  
See infra Part II.B.  A state’s power to take custody of unclaimed property is primarily justified by the 
argument that the state is in a better position than the holder to reunite the owner with her property, but this 
justification falls flat in a market where the owner’s identity is never known.  See infra Part II.A. 
 19 Bohl et al., supra note 16, at 23. 
 20 Philip Keitel, The Laws, Regulations, Guidelines, and Industry Practices That Protect Consumers Who 
Use Gift Cards 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 08-07, 2008), 
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2008/ 
D2008JulyGiftCard.pdf.  For a discussion of innovations that have resulted in hybridized gift cards that may 
be classified as semi-closed or semi-open, see generally Furletti, supra note 17, at 4–7. 
 21 Furletti, supra note 17, at 2; Keitel, supra note 20, at 2. 
 22 Keitel, supra note 20, at 2. 
 23 Open-loop gift cards are sometimes referred to as network-branded prepaid cards.  See id. at 3. 
 24 Id. at 2–3. 
 25 Id. at 3. 
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with additional funds, options for replacement of lost or stolen cards, and 
expiration dates or dormancy fees.26 
Although somewhat similar, gift cards are distinguishable from gift 
certificates in a number of significant ways.27  First, retailers need not 
reimburse consumers in cash for any unredeemed value because gift cards are 
able to store the card’s value across multiple transactions.28  Second, many gift 
cards may be reloaded with additional funds thanks to their value-storing 
capability.29  Third, gift cards better protect against fraud (they are not easily 
counterfeited) and theft (they are not activated until the time of sale).30  
Finally, gift cards are better equipped to track consumer usage for marketing 
purposes.31 
The benefits of gift cards extend to both consumers and retailers.  Gift 
cards offer consumers convenience by reducing transaction costs and are often 
more desirable as gifts because they retain the utility of cash but convey a 
greater degree of thoughtfulness.32  Gift cards benefit retailers by increasing 
customer loyalty and sales volume, reducing credit risk, and decreasing time 
spent at the point of sale.33 
B. Escheat and Unclaimed Property Laws 
To better understand the purpose of modern unclaimed property laws, the 
development of the dual-priority structure for competing interstate claims, and 
the legitimacy of a third-priority rule, this section will first address the origin 
of unclaimed property laws, and second, the creation of various Uniform Acts.  
This section concludes by arguing that the underlying justifications of 
unclaimed property laws do not support states’ claims on gift card breakage. 
 
 26 Bohl et al., supra note 16, at 23. 
 27 Furletti, supra note 17, at 2–3. 
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 See, e.g., Card FAQs, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., http://www.starbucks.com/customer-service/ 
faqs/card (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 30 Furletti, supra note 17, at 3. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See The Mktg. Workshop, Inc., Marketing Intelligence Through Research: Adult Gift Card Study 
2007, at 36–38 (2007) (PowerPoint presentation) (on file with the Emory Law Journal) (surveying reasons that 
respondents purchased gift cards for themselves or others). 
 33 Furletti, supra note 17, at 3. 
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1. Common Law Roots and Subsequent Departure 
American unclaimed property laws are rooted in the feudal English 
common law doctrines of escheat and bona vacantia.34  Under the doctrine of 
escheat, the real property of a tenant who died without heirs would revert back 
to the feudal lord or Crown.35  Similarly, the doctrine of bona vacantia 
prescribed that abandoned personal property would transfer to the Crown.36  
Under escheat the Crown’s claim was based on its status as the ultimate owner 
of all real property, whereas under bona vacantia the Crown simply had a 
greater claim to personal property than all but the rightful owner.37 
Following the Revolutionary War and formation of the United States, the 
states adopted English common law regarding escheat and bona vacantia.38  
However, the Americanization of these two doctrines quickly departed from 
their feudal foundations and eventually merged into a single doctrine of 
escheat, which encompassed both real and tangible personal property.39 
Under the American doctrine, instead of reverting to the Crown, real and 
tangible personal property transfers in title to the state, provided the state has 
enacted specific legislation.40  Although the sovereignty of the Crown was 
disseminated among the various states, determining the particular state to 
which real and tangible personal property should escheat is relatively easy.  
The state in which the property is physically located—the situs—has the 
exclusive power to escheat.41  In other words, for a state to have the power to 
escheat real or tangible personal property, the state must have specific 
 
 34 Susan T. Kelly, Note, Unclaimed Billions: Federal Encroachment on States’ Rights in Abandoned 
Property, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1992). 
 35 Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. & David J. Epstein, Issues of Sovereignty in Escheat and the Uniform 
Unclaimed Property Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1983). 
 36 Id. at 1431. 
 37 Id. at 1430–31 nn.3–4. 
 38 1 DAVID J. EPSTEIN, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW AND REPORTING FORMS § 1.04 (Matthew Bender 
rev. ed. 2010). 
 39 Id. (“Like most seeds transported to foreign soil and a different climate, the offspring that flourished 
was far different from the original stock.”); see also Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1327 (1961) (“Modern statutes thus perform dual functions, continuing the traditions of 
both bona vacantia and common law escheat.”). 
 40 EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 1.04; see also Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) 
(“The state may more properly be custodian and beneficiary of abandoned property than any person.”).  
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly grant the federal government the power to escheat, 
there have been particular circumstances where a federal power to escheat has been upheld.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (upholding a federal statute that enables the federal government to 
claim personal property of a veteran who dies intestate in a Veterans’ Administration Hospital). 
 41 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965). 
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legislation covering the property in question, and the property must be 
physically located within the state’s territorial borders. 
Modern American development of unclaimed property laws, however, 
significantly departed from its English common law roots.42  Courts and state 
legislatures expanded the subject matter of escheat to include unclaimed 
intangible personal property.43  Unlike the English common law of escheat and 
bona vacantia, which vested absolute title to the Crown, American unclaimed 
property laws are generally custodial in nature44—the state merely holds the 
unclaimed property in perpetuity until the rightful owner asserts a claim to it.45  
A significant consequence of this custodial nature is the derivative rights 
doctrine, which provides that the rights of the state as to the unclaimed 
property are derived from the rights of the owner.46  In other words, the state 
stands in the shoes of the owner and has no greater rights to the unclaimed 
property than did the owner.47 
Further, unclaimed property laws differ from true escheat laws insofar as 
unclaimed property laws are based on abandonment rather than intestate 
succession and apply primarily to intangible personal property.48 
Similar to American escheat of real and tangible personal property, a state’s 
power to take custody of unclaimed intangible personal property depends on 
 
 42 Kelly, supra note 34, at 1043; cf. 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, prefatory note, 8C U.L.A. at 89 
(“[T]he State does not take title to unclaimed property, but takes custody only, and holds the property in 
perpetuity for the owner.”).  However, a few states have enacted unclaimed property laws that are truly escheat 
statutes.  Kelly, supra note 34, at 1043–44 & n.60 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 32-9-1-36 (LexisNexis 1991); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 471-C:30 (1990)). 
 43 EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 1.04; see also Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905) (finding 
that interest payments were subject to unclaimed property laws).  However, prior to the first Uniform Act in 
1954, only ten states had enacted comprehensive unclaimed property legislation.  Michael Houghton et al., 
Unclaimed Property, 74-2d C.P.S. (BNA) § II(B)(1) (2003). 
 44 See 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, prefatory note, 8C U.L.A. at 89. 
 45 Kelly, supra note 34, at 1043; see also 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, prefatory note, 8C U.L.A. at 89. 
 46 1 ANTHONY L. ANDREOLI & J. BROOKE SPOTSWOOD, GUIDE TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AND ESCHEAT 
LAWS § 3.05 (2d ed. 1998); see also Houghton et al., supra note 43, § VI(C). 
 47 Ethan D. Millar & John L. Coalson, Jr., The Pot of Gold at the End of the Class Action Lawsuit: Can 
States Claim It as Unclaimed Property?, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 511, 516 (2009); see also Houghton et al., supra 
note 43, § VI(C).  However, there are some exceptions to this fundamental principle.  For example, although a 
statute of limitations may circumscribe an owner’s ability to claim her property from a holder under some 
circumstances, section 19(a) of the 1995 Act precludes such a statute of limitations from preventing a state’s 
claim against a holder.  See 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 19(a), 8C U.L.A. at 134–35; ANDREOLI & 
SPOTSWOOD, supra note 46, § 7.03. 
 48 Kelly, supra note 34, at 1044.  Unclaimed property laws extend to limited types of tangible personal 
property as well, such as the contents of safe-deposit boxes.  See 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 3, 8C 
U.L.A. at 110. 
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whether the state has specific legislation covering the property in question.  
However, the primary difficulty in determining a state’s sovereignty over 
intangible personal property is that, by its nature, intangible personal property 
cannot be located on a map.  To resolve this difficulty, states and courts later 
ventured to construct a standard for determining a fictional situs for unclaimed 
property.49 
2. Uniform Unclaimed Property Acts 
Although true escheat laws present little difficulty in determining the situs 
of the property in question, the opportunity for states to capitalize on property 
from owners who die intestate occurs relatively infrequently.50  As states began 
to realize there were more lucrative opportunities in unclaimed intangible 
personal property,51 aided by the Supreme Court’s general willingness to 
uphold state unclaimed property laws,52 legislation increased among the states 
to capture unclaimed property as a form of nontax revenue.53  However, the 
legislation varied substantially from state to state and was “neither well-
organized nor well-integrated.”54  In 1954, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted the Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (the 1954 Act) to resolve the escalating 
confusion among the states.55 
Since the 1954 Act, the NCCUSL has adopted three subsequent versions of 
the Uniform Act.56  The 1954 Act was revised in 1966,57 and in 1981 the 
NCCUSL proposed the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (the 1981 Act),58 
 
 49 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 35, at 1434–35; see also infra Part III. 
 50 See Wolfe, supra note 3, at 173. 
 51 Note, supra note 39, at 1330. 
 52 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 35, at 1436. 
 53 Wolfe, supra note 3, at 190. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, NBPCA WHITE PAPER—ABANDONED PROPERTY LAWS 
AND NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS: QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS RAISED WHEN TRYING TO FIT CARDS 
INTO THE EXISTING ABANDONED PROPERTY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3–5 (2009). 
 57 The revisions were made particularly to address issues with money orders and traveler’s checks.  Id. at 
4. 
 58 The 1981 Act superseded the previous versions and codified the holding in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 
U.S. 674 (1965), regarding the priority structure of conflicting interstate claims to abandoned property.  
Houghton et al., supra note 43, § III(C); see also infra Part III.  Additionally, the 1981 Act was the first 
version to expressly add gift certificates to the definition of intangible property.  NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID 
CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 4. 
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which was subsequently revised in 1995 (the 1995 Act).59  The majority of 
states have adopted some version of the Uniform Act, subject to 
modification.60  All versions are custodial61 and exclusively cover intangible 
personal property.62 
The Acts apply when property is “presumed abandoned.”63  The 1995 Act 
includes a general definition of “property,” whereas the earlier versions 
devised specific rules catered to particular holders.64  Various categories of 
property have differing dormancy periods, after which they are presumed 
abandoned.65  The holder of such property—the entity that is obligated to hold 
the property on account of the owner—must file a report with the state 
administrator listing the type of property and specific information about the 
owner, if recorded.66  Once the dormancy period has transpired, the state takes 
possession of the property and must take affirmative steps to notify the 
owner.67  After a specified period of time, the state sells the unclaimed 
property and deposits the proceeds into the general fund or some other state 
fund.68  Finally, the rightful owners, including heirs and devisees, may claim 
the funds at any future point.69 
The stated objectives of the Acts include protection, convenience, 
accessibility, fairness, and assurance that the public benefits from the use of 
unclaimed property.70  The Acts protect the owner’s property until it can be 
 
 59 Ellen P. Aprill, Inadvertence and the Internal Revenue Code: Federal Tax Consequences of State 
Unclaimed Property Laws, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 123, 134 (2000).  The 1995 Act diverged from the previous 
versions in organization and effect, refined the definition of “holder” in response to Delaware v. New York, 
507 U.S. 490 (1993), and shortened dormancy periods for gift certificates among other types of property.  
NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 5; see also Aprill, supra, at 134. 
 60 See NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3. 
 61 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, prefatory note, 8C U.L.A. at 89. 
 62 Id. § 1 cmt., 8C U.L.A. at 100.  But see supra note 48 (noting that the contents of safe-deposit boxes 
are subject to escheat). 
 63 See 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, §§ 2, 4, 8C U.L.A. at 102, 111; Aprill, supra note 59, at 134. 
 64 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § IV(A).  However, all versions include a catch-all provision.  See id. 
§ IV(A) n.4; accord 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 2(a)(15), 8C U.L.A. at 103 (providing a five-year 
dormancy period for “all other property”). 
 65 See Aprill, supra note 59, at 134–35 (“For example, wages and other compensation for personal 
services are presumed abandoned one year after the compensation becomes payable.”).  The dormancy periods 
were shortened in the 1981 Act, Houghton et al., supra note 43, § III(C), and again in the 1995 Act, Aprill, 
supra note 59, at 135. 
 66 Aprill, supra note 59, at 134–35. 
 67 Id. at 135–36. 
 68 Id. at 136. 
 69 Id. 
 70 NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3. 
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reclaimed.71  They create convenience by facilitating a single location for 
rightful owners to discover and assert a claim to their property.72  The Acts 
uphold fairness by preventing private holders of unclaimed property from 
receiving an unjust windfall.73  Finally, the Acts aim to prevent economic 
waste by redirecting unclaimed property back to the public.74 
II. WHY UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAWS SHOULD NOT APPLY TO GIFT CARDS 
This Part argues that unclaimed property laws should not encompass gift 
cards within their subject matter.75  Section A argues that the traditional 
justifications for unclaimed property laws fall short when applied to gift cards.  
For example, the primary objective of unclaimed property laws is to reunite the 
owner with her property, and the laws assume that the state is in a better 
position to facilitate recovery than the person or entity in possession of the 
property.  However, because states and retailers do not know the identity of the 
ultimate recipient of gift cards, the state is no better equipped than the retailer 
to reunite gift cards with their anonymous owners.  Section B argues that 
unclaimed property laws that attempt to escheat the full face value of gift cards 
violate the derivative rights doctrine.  Section C argues that reporting 
procedures’ complexity and unclaimed property laws’ failure to clearly address 
gift cards create practical problems, even for businesses attempting to comply 
in good faith.  This uncertainty will have a chilling effect on innovation in a 
rapidly developing industry that benefits consumers and retailers alike. 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.  However, at least one court has noted the inherent tension between this purpose and the purpose of 
reuniting the property with the owner.  See Taylor v. Chiang, No. Civ. S-01-2407 WBS GGH, 2007 WL 
1628050, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 1) (“If the purpose of the law is . . . to reunite owners with their lost or 
forgotten property, its ultimate goal should be to generate little or no revenue at all for the state.”), vacated on 
other grounds, 2007 WL 3049645 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Taylor v. 
Westly, 525 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 74 NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3.  However some courts have reasoned 
that the goal of raising revenue should be minimized in light of the primary goal of reuniting owners with their 
property.  See Taylor, 2007 WL 1628050, at *4; Millar & Coalson, supra note 47, at 516–17 & n.9 (citing Am. 
Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hollenbach, 630 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Ky. 2009)). 
 75 A majority of states have either fully or partially exempted gift cards from their escheat laws for many 
of the reasons discussed in this Part.  The 1981 and 1995 Acts, however, encompass gift certificates within 
their subject matter.  1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 1(13)(ii), 8C U.L.A. at 98; UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. 
ACT § 14, 8C U.L.A. 216 (2001) (superseded 1995) [hereinafter 1981 UNIF. ACT].  Some states have 
unclaimed property legislation that expressly addresses gift certificates—for example, Delaware, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1198–1199 (2010), and New York, N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 1315 (McKinney 2009), where 
a majority of businesses are incorporated.  Under the dual-priority structure discussed below in Part III.B, 
these states will continue to reap substantial benefits from unclaimed gift card breakage. 
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A. Traditional Justifications Fall Flat 
Although the justifications for unclaimed property laws effectively apply to 
most types of intangible personal property, those justifications fall flat when 
applied to gift cards.  The primary objective of unclaimed property laws is to 
reunite property with its rightful owner.76  However, the very nature of gift 
cards is such that neither the name nor the last known address of the ultimate 
recipient is ever disclosed to the holder.  Consequently, states are never able to 
reunite unclaimed breakage with its anonymous owner.77 
Arguably, nothing prohibits states from requiring businesses to obtain the 
identity and address of the ultimate recipient of gift cards, which would resolve 
this informational gap.78  However, state laws requiring businesses to obtain 
the ultimate recipient’s personal information would be unreasonable for several 
reasons.  Most importantly, businesses sell gift cards anonymously to protect 
consumer privacy concerns.79  Requiring consumers to disclose their own 
personal information violates these privacy concerns, never mind requiring 
them to disclose the personal information of recipients.  Second, mandated 
disclosure vitiates the benefit that gift cards create by reducing transaction 
costs for consumers and retailers.80  For example, a consumer will be 
dissuaded from purchasing a gift card if the consumer must have on hand the 
recipient’s personal information at the time of sale.  Finally, businesses often 
offer optional registration81 and are better positioned than government to 
determine the ideal methods for such programs. 
 
 76 See NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3, 19. 
 77 The Court in Pennsylvania v. New York refused to accept as a relevant concern that money orders 
involve a higher percentage of unknown addresses than other forms of unclaimed property.  407 U.S. 206, 
214–15 (1972).  However, this may be explained by the fact that the Court believed that there were actually “a 
substantial number of creditors’ addresses” available.  Id. at 215. 
 78 EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 9.01; see also Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 509 n.12 (1993) 
(“[N]othing in our decisions ‘prohibits the States from requiring [debtors] to keep adequate address records.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 215)).  For example, New Jersey recently 
enacted legislation that requires SVC issuers to “obtain the name and address of the purchaser or owner of 
each stored value card issued or sold.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30B-42.1(c) (West 2010).  Although this section 
of the New Jersey statute was challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the data-collection provision was 
initially upheld.  See N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, No. 10-5059 (FLW), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3911, at *24 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2011).  However, two weeks later, the Third Circuit granted a temporary 
injunction enjoining enforcement of the data-collection provision.  See Order Granting Temporary Injunction, 
No. 11-1141 (3d Cir. Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://files.cecollect.com/111/1312/Order.pdf. 
 79 Alini, supra note 8. 
 80 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 12.31 (“The transactions which give rise to such property simply do not 
provide a reasonable opportunity for detailed information-gathering.”). 
 81 See, e.g., Card FAQs, supra note 29. 
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The justification of convenience (i.e., creating a single location for an 
owner to discover and assert a claim) fails for the same reason that the 
justification of protection fails.  Since there is no record of the owner’s name 
or last known address, it is impossible for an owner to discover—let alone 
assert a claim to—her unclaimed property.  In fact, if a business offers a 
registration option then it will be more likely to notify an owner that she has 
breakage; the owner will be more likely to return to the business to redeem her 
balance, and possibly make additional purchases.  In this situation, it is far 
more convenient for an owner to be notified rather than placing the burden of 
discovery on the owner.  While many states have created websites for 
consumers to search for unclaimed property,82 such states do not go beyond 
this passive form of notice.  Further, the procedure for asserting a claim to 
unclaimed property from the state may be particularly rigorous and hardly 
convenient.83 
The next two justifications—preventing unjust windfalls to private holders 
and redirecting unclaimed property back to the public—are equally 
unconvincing for related reasons.  Windfalls may be understood, as one 
commentator argues, “as economic gains independent of work, planning, or 
other productive activities that society wishes to reward.”84  True escheat laws 
aptly fit this definition.85  For example, the behavior of most people to draft 
wills rather than to “die broke” indicates that there is some utility in 
distributing wealth after death.86  This utility incentivizes people to participate 
in productive activities, which is desirable to society.87  Conversely, if a person 
dies intestate and without heirs, the state may properly escheat the estate 
because this windfall capture does not create disincentives for the living to 
avoid working hard for the benefit of their successors.88 
 
 82 See, e.g., Unclaimed Property Program, GA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://etax.dor.ga.gov/PTD/ 
ucp/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 83 See, e.g., Escheat—Unclaimed Property, DEL. DIV. OF REVENUE, http://revenue.delaware.gov/unprop/ 
unprop_search.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (requiring submission of a “coupon” along with a copy of the 
claimant’s driver’s license, followed by subsequent submission of “additional information,” all of which takes 
upwards of sixteen weeks to complete). 
 84 Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 85 Id. at 1553–54. 
 86 Id. at 1553.  When a person dies intestate, but has heirs, the estate usually transfers to the heirs under 
the presumption that everyone intends to bequeath their property to relatives despite the oversight of not 
drafting a will.  Id. 
 87 See id. (“[Distributing wealth to heirs rather than annuitizing wealth during old age] indicates that 
making gifts upon death has great utility to most people.”). 
 88 Id. at 1553–54. 
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However, when this windfall analysis is applied to the escheat of gift cards, 
it is apparent that gift card breakage is not actually a windfall because the 
breakage is returned to a more closely tailored group than the general public.89  
Businesses have invested substantially in the development of gift cards, an 
innovation that benefits both consumers and retailers.90  Breakage is a direct 
result of the productive activities of businesses reflecting the costs of 
development, and therefore not a windfall that the state is entitled to capture. 
Further, under the above windfall analysis, the exemption of gift cards from 
escheat laws is more likely to return the economic gain to the owners.91  In a 
competitive market, businesses that retain breakage are likely to pass on the 
savings to consumers, who are a smaller population than the general public, 
and this subgroup is more likely to encompass gift card owners and 
purchasers.92  The consumer’s risk of failing to redeem the full value of gift 
cards is spread across a smaller and more relevant group.  This reduces costs, 
encourages an industry that benefits society, and minimizes economic waste.93 
B. Converting a Right to Merchandise into a Right to Cash Violates the 
Derivative Rights Doctrine 
Another criticism of state unclaimed property laws that apply to gift cards 
is based on their violation of the derivative rights doctrine, which limits the 
rights of the state to the rights of the owner.94  Owners of gift cards have the 
limited right to exchange the value stored on the gift card for merchandise but 
are not entitled to exchange that stored value for cash.95  However, states that 
escheat gift card breakage require the holder to turn over the cash value in lieu 
of merchandise.  This practice effectively grants a greater right to the state than 
the owner ever had.96 
 
 89 Cf. id. at 1554 (“[O]ther recent innovations of the doctrine are questionable.”). 
 90 See supra Part I.A. 
 91 Cf. Kades, supra note 84, at 1554 (analyzing the validity of escheat of unredeemed traveler’s checks 
under a windfall analysis). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 95 See supra Part I.A. 
 96 See Millar & Coalson, supra note 47, at 530 (noting that states’ conversion of vouchers or coupons, 
which are often awarded to plaintiffs in class action settlements and are redeemable for merchandise only, into 
cash through escheat violates the derivative rights doctrine). 
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Courts have addressed this issue with conflicting results.  In Connecticut 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore,97 the Supreme Court did not require the 
state to satisfy an insurance provision that required the policyholder to present 
proof of death because the state was acting as a conservator and it would be 
unreasonable to compel the state to comply with conditions that would 
otherwise be proper between the contracting parties.98  Accordingly, for a state 
to avoid violation of the derivative rights doctrine, the limitation on the 
owner’s right to performance must be proper, and the condition must be 
unreasonable for the state, as a conservator, to satisfy.99 
Arguably, requiring a state to collect merchandise from retailers would 
seem unreasonable.  However, several courts have concluded that the state is 
not entitled to cash for unredeemed, merchandise-only gift certificates.100  
Conversely, other courts have held that states may escheat the cash equivalent 
for unredeemed, merchandise-only gift certificates.101  Even if there is no 
violation of the doctrine because it is unreasonable to require a state to collect 
merchandise, escheat of the full face value of the gift card is certainly a 
violation.  When a consumer uses a gift card for merchandise, the value of the 
gift card is applied to the merchandise’s retail value, while the business retains 
the profit from the difference between the wholesale and retail prices.  
Therefore, a state claiming the full value of the breakage violates the doctrine 
by obtaining a right to the merchandise’s wholesale value instead of its lesser 
retail value.  Section 2(7) of the 1995 Act takes this into consideration and 
attempts to avoid any violation by limiting the amount of escheat for 
merchandise-only gift certificates to 60% of the face value.102 
However, as the next section addresses, it is unclear whether gift cards even 
fall under the same provisions that apply to gift certificates.  If gift cards 
 
 97 333 U.S. 541 (1948). 
 98 Id. at 547. 
 99 EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 9.04. 
 100 E.g., In re Nov. 8, 1996, Determination of the State, Dep’t of the Treasury, Unclaimed Prop. Office, 
706 A.2d 1177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff’d per curiam, 722 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1999); State v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 153 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Serv. Merch. Co. v. Adams, No. 97-2982-III, 
2001 WL 34384462 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. June 29, 2001), appeal dismissed on other grounds, No. M2001-01895-
COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002).  Some commentators, however, have questioned the underlying 
reasoning of the holdings in these cases.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 9.04. 
 101 E.g., State ex rel. Callahan v. Marshall Field & Co., 404 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Murdock v. 
John B. Stetson Co., 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 300, 1963 WL 6456 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1963). 
 102 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 2(7), 8C U.L.A. at 103; cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1953(G) 
(2009). 
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instead fall under the 1995 Act’s catch-all provision,103 which does not account 
for retailers’ anticipated profits, then escheat of gift cards remains a violation 
of the derivative rights doctrine. 
C. Practical Problems of Compliance 
Many states’ unclaimed property laws were written before the prominence 
of gift cards and consequently fail to provide adequate guidance for retailers 
while subjecting them to the risk of substantial noncompliance 
consequences.104 
While the 1995 Act includes gift certificates under its definition of 
property,105 it does not explicitly include gift cards nor does it provide a 
definition of gift certificate.  Although states will likely interpret gift cards to 
fall under the gift certificate category, this approach presents issues that are 
difficult to resolve.106  For example, shoehorning gift cards into the gift 
certificates category leaves uncertain whether reloading a gift card with 
additional funds—an attribute unique to gift cards—would interrupt the 
running of the dormancy period or whether the dormancy period would 
continuously run from the date of purchase.107  Businesses utilizing gift cards 
instead of gift certificates will have scant guidance as to whether states that 
exempt gift certificates from reporting will also exempt gift cards, or whether 
gift cards might fall under the law’s catch-all provision for intangible personal 
property not conceived of at the time the law was written.108  The period of 
presumed abandonment will be equally unclear when the 1995 Act states that it 
is three years for gift certificates, while it is five years for property that falls 
under the catch-all provision.109 
 
 103 See infra Part II.C. 
 104 See Stephanie Cutler et al., What Corporate America Needs to Know About Unclaimed Property: A 
Primer for the Business Holder, 54 TAX EXECUTIVE 335, 337–38 (2002) (describing the risks of 
noncompliance with state unclaimed property laws). 
 105 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 1, 8C U.L.A. at 98. 
 106 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § VIII(A).  However, at least one state, Colorado, has concluded that 
gift cards fall under the catch-all provision rather than the gift certificate provision.  See Status of Stored Value 
Cards, Including Gift Cards, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 05-01, 2005 Colo. AG LEXIS 1, at *1, *4 (Apr. 13, 2005). 
 107 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § VIII(A). 
 108 See id. (noting that exemptions applicable to gift certificates may not apply to gift cards). 
 109 NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 14.  Adding yet another wrinkle to the 
compliance problem is the enactment of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, which provides that gift cards may not 
expire until at least five years from the date they are issued.  Pub. L. No. 111-24, sec. 401, § 915(c)(2), 123 
Stat. 1734, 1753 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693l–1(c)(2) (Supp. III 2009)).  Consequently, issuers may be 
forced to report unclaimed breakage to states before gift cards have even expired under federal limits.  This 
would increase the likelihood that businesses will later have to seek reimbursement from states when 
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Another difference between certificates and cards is the gift card’s unique 
ability to store its remaining value after multiple uses, which creates 
uncertainty for purposes of determining what face value means.110  The face 
value of a gift certificate necessarily indicates the actual amount presumed 
abandoned because a certificate’s single-use trait entails that the certificate has 
been used either in full or not at all.  A gift card owner, however, may use all 
but $10 of the gift card’s $100 face value.111  Under the 1995 Act, which 
requires the holder to submit 60% of the face value, would the retailer be 
required to submit $6 or $60?112  The answer remains unclear.  Common sense 
demands that the latter amount could not possibly be correct because the 
holder would lose money by implementing gift cards, but a strict interpretation 
of the Act’s language does not support this commonsense conclusion.  The 
uncertainty is likely to dissuade many businesses from offering gift cards, 
particularly smaller businesses where the costs of legal consultation and risks 
of audit or litigation will outweigh the benefits of gift card programs. 
The risks of noncompliance are substantial even for businesses that attempt 
in good faith to adhere to states’ unclaimed property laws.113  As states have 
increasingly used unclaimed property laws as a source of nontax revenue, 
businesses have been subjected to more comprehensive state audits.114  Audits 
for unclaimed property may reach back at least ten years, and in some states as 
far back as fifteen to twenty years, before the expiration of the dormancy 
period.115  If the business records are incomplete or nonexistent, the auditors 
may use an estimation process—regarded as dubious by some commentators—
to determine the principal amount of property owed.116  Any unreported 
property is then subject to an interest rate upwards of 18% per year, may incur 
 
consumers use unexpired, but escheated gift card breakage.  See New York and New Jersey Propose 
Significant Unclaimed Property Amendments, SUTHERLAND, 2 (July, 7, 2010), http://www.sutherland.com/ 
files/News/5d7e4f3b-c493-40c9-b372-505024d185d6/Presentation/NewsAttachment/e2eb7b96-81a4-4852-
81fe-52fc6d95b249/SALT%20Alert%207.7.10.pdf. 
 110 See NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 18 (“If there is no face amount on 
the prepaid card, does that mean there is no escheat obligation?”). 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. (“The law was written with a one-time-use paper gift certificate in mind and does not translate 
equitably to multi-use prepaid cards with a ‘face value’ that may have no relation to the current value.”). 
 113 Cutler et al., supra note 104, at 337. 
 114 Id. at 336–37; cf. Unclaimed Property Laws: Gift Card Stocking Stuffers Can Become Lumps of Coal 
for Unwary Retailers, MORGAN LEWIS, 2 (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/ 
Tax_LF_UnclaimedPropertyLaws_21dec10.pdf (noting that Delaware often hires third-party auditors on a 
contingency basis). 
 115 Cutler et al., supra note 104, at 337. 
 116 Id. 
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monetary penalties as high as $500 per day of noncompliance, and in some 
rare cases may result in criminal penalties.117  Additionally, noncompliance 
may subject businesses to federal liability for violations of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.118 
D. Summary 
Given the lackluster justifications for applying unclaimed property laws to 
gift cards, the difficulties they present for the derivative rights doctrine, the 
lack of clarity in current state laws, and the high stakes of noncompliance, it is 
clear why more than half the states have exempted gift cards to some degree 
from their unclaimed property laws.119  Unfortunately, those states that 
continue to include gift cards in their unclaimed property laws are able to 
escheat gift cards even when the cards are bought or sold in states that exempt 
gift cards.  The following Part addresses this discrepancy and what solutions 
there may be to amend the current structure of unclaimed property laws 
generally, or specifically, in the gift card context. 
III.  CONFLICTING INTERSTATE CLAIMS 
In Parts I and II, this Comment addressed the question of what property 
should be the subject matter of unclaimed property laws and concluded that 
such laws should not encompass gift cards.  The next question, which this Part 
addresses, is to which state does unclaimed property escheat.  While 
determining the situs of tangible property is quite easy, it is far more difficult 
to identify the “situs” of intangible property, which necessarily cannot be 
geographically located. 
This Part begins in section A by describing the Supreme Court’s initial 
efforts to determine which state has the power to escheat and how the Court 
struggled to identify the fictional situs of intangible property.  Section B 
addresses the Court’s creation of the current system.  In Texas v. New 
Jersey,120 the Court devised the dual-priority structure whereby unclaimed 
property escheats to the state of the owner’s last known address.  However, if 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § VII(A)–(B). 
 119 For a comprehensive summary of state—and to a lesser extent, federal—laws regarding gift cards, see 
Gift Cards and Gift Certificates Statutes and Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12474 (last updated Sept. 3, 2010). 
 120 379 U.S. 674 (1965). 
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there is no last known address, then the unclaimed property escheats to the 
state of the holder’s incorporation.  Initially this structure was premised on 
efficiency and equity, and not on precedent.  In subsequent cases the Court 
faced more complex fact situations that questioned the utility of the dual-
priority structure, but the Court strictly adhered to its rule based on efficiency 
and precedent.  However, the subsequent holdings departed from the Court’s 
reasoning in Texas, which was based on equity.  Ultimately, the Court 
indicated that it would not depart from its bright-line rule in Texas and 
effectively delegated to Congress the responsibility of making any necessary 
changes.  The consequences of this line of cases in the gift card context will be 
addressed in Part IV. 
A. The Race of Diligence 
Traditionally, a state’s power to escheat property was determined by 
whether the situs of the property was located within that state’s territorial 
borders.121  Although identifying the situs of tangible property is relatively 
straightforward, difficult issues arise when attempting to locate a fictional situs 
for intangible property.122  Up until the mid-twentieth century, the bulk of 
unclaimed property litigation revolved around intrastate disputes regarding 
states’ power to escheat.123  However, the likelihood of conflicting state claims 
became inevitable as the breadth of the states’ general power to escheat and the 
corresponding potential revenue increased.124  Originally, the test for a state’s 
claim of sovereignty was premised on that state’s contacts with the 
obligation.125  However, the contacts test would ultimately prove unworkable 
following the practical result of two Supreme Court cases.126 
First, in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, the Court was 
asked to consider the validity of the New York Abandoned Property Law.127  
The statute covered unclaimed proceeds of insurance policies for New York 
residents issued by insurance companies incorporated in states other than New 
 
 121 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 35, at 1434. 
 122 Id.; see also Texas, 379 U.S. at 677; Wolfe, supra note 3, at 193 (“The simple situs rules . . . cannot 
handle any more than two states in competition for the right to escheat.”). 
 123 See Houghton et al., supra note 43, § V(A)(1). 
 124 See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 35, at 1436. 
 125 Id. at 1437. 
 126 See id. at 1437–40 (discussing the Court’s application of the contacts test in Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948), and Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951)). 
 127 333 U.S. at 542. 
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York.128  The Court held that New York had sufficient contacts with the 
property but declined to address potential claims by other states.129 
However, three Justices dissented.  Justice Frankfurter argued that the case 
really concerned “the conflicting claims of several States in a hotchpot of 
undifferentiated obligations” and therefore required proper presentation by the 
various interested states under the Court’s original jurisdiction.130  Justice 
Jackson, with whom Justice Douglas joined, criticized the contacts test as 
unworkable when comparing competing states’ power to escheat since multiple 
states would have “sufficient contacts” with the property.131 
Thirteen years later, the Court upheld the validity of the New Jersey 
Escheat Act in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey.132  The statute allowed New 
Jersey to escheat from a New Jersey corporation unpaid dividends whose 
owners’ last known addresses were located out of state.133  The Court reasoned 
that New Jersey had power to escheat the unpaid dividends because the 
corporation was “amenable to process through its designated agent.”134  
Further, the Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would prevent the 
risk of multiple liability arising from claims by other states.135 
Four Justices dissented.  Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Jackson 
joined, argued that the majority’s reasoning conflicted with the holding in 
Moore, which looked to the state of the owner’s last known address.136  
Further, Justice Frankfurter was concerned that the majority holding would 
place the Constitution “in an unseemly light” by creating a “race of 
diligence.”137  Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joined, listed multiple 
possible states that might lay claim to the unpaid dividends under the contacts 
test, of which only New Jersey was represented in the case.138 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 548–49. 
 130 See id. at 552, 555 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 131 See id. at 558–63 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 132 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
 133 Id. at 429, 437 n.8.  The only “contact” that the corporation had with New Jersey was its registered 
office and agent, both of which were located in New Jersey.  See id. at 437, 438. 
 134 Id. at 438. 
 135 Id. at 443. 
 136 Id. at 444 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 137 Id.  Particularly, New Jersey’s Act was a true escheat statute rather than custodial, which meant that no 
other state would be able to lay claim to the property once the title had been transferred exclusively to New 
Jersey.  Id. 
 138 Id. at 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Frankfurter’s concern—that the effect of the decisions in Moore and 
Standard Oil would create a “race of diligence”—was realized over the next 
decade as states broadened the reach of their unclaimed property laws and 
substantially shortened their dormancy periods.139  It was not until 1961 that 
the Court would return to the issue and bring the race to an end in Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania.140  Here, the Court held that 
Pennsylvania did not have the power to escheat from a New York corporation 
unclaimed money orders purchased in Pennsylvania by non-Pennsylvania 
residents, because Pennsylvania did not have the power to protect the holder 
corporation from potential claims by other states.141  The Court effectively 
invited any states with conflicting escheat claims to bring suit under the 
Court’s original jurisdiction.142  Four years later, the invitation was accepted in 
Texas v. New Jersey.143  In Texas, the Court would establish the current 
structure for resolving conflicting interstate claims. 
B. Dual-Pronged Priority Structure (Texas v. New Jersey and Its Progeny) 
This section lays out the current federal solution for resolving conflicting 
interstate claims to nearly all forms of unclaimed property.  Subsection 1 traces 
the different options the Court considered in Texas v. New Jersey144 to resolve 
interstate conflicts and outlines the dual-priority structure that it ultimately 
created.  The dual-priority structure may be simply stated as: (1) the state in 
which the owner’s last known address is located has the power to escheat the 
unclaimed property, but (2) if that state does not have a law covering the 
property or if there is no record of the last known address, then the state in 
which the holder is incorporated has the power to escheat the unclaimed 
property. 
Subsection 2 addresses Pennsylvania v. New York,145 in which the Court 
was presented with a fact situation that strained the underlying rationale of the 
 
 139 Cary B. Hall, Note, Escheat?  Gesundheit.  But for States, It’s Nothing to Sneeze At: Delaware v. New 
York, 113 S.Ct. 1550 (1993), 5 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 79, 88 (1994–1995); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 38, 
§ 2.03 (“It was not uncommon to find abandonment periods of 14 and 20 years prior to the Standard Oil 
decision.  By 1954 several states had shortened the period to seven years.”). 
 140 368 U.S. 71 (1961). 
 141 Id. at 72–73, 75. 
 142 See Billy F. Hicks, Comment, Escheat in Texas: A Current Look at the Intangible Issue, 29 SW. L.J. 
575, 582 (1975). 
 143 379 U.S. 674 (1965). 
 144 Id. 
 145 407 U.S. 206 (1972). 
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dual-priority structure.  However, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Texas, 
tilting the scales in favor of efficiency rather than equity.  Subsection 3 briefly 
addresses the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks 
Act, in which Congress superseded Pennsylvania by statutorily altering the 
dual-priority structure for specific types of unclaimed property.  Finally, 
subsection 4 presents Delaware v. New York,146 the last case the Court has 
heard concerning the dual-priority structure.  In Delaware, the Court refused to 
depart from its bright-line rule, despite further erosion of the rule’s originally 
proffered rationale.  Instead, the Court expressly deferred to Congress as the 
appropriate agent for resolving any specific defects in the rule. 
1. Texas v. New Jersey 
In Texas v. New Jersey, Texas invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction and 
sought declaratory relief to settle which state had the right to escheat 
unclaimed property held by Sun Oil Company.147  Four different states asserted 
a right to some portion of the unclaimed property, and each proposed a distinct 
rule to be adopted by the Court.148  First, Texas proposed that the state with the 
most significant contacts with the debt should be entitled to escheat it.149  
Second, New Jersey, in which Sun Oil was incorporated, argued that the state 
in which the debtor is domiciled should have the right to escheat.150  Third, 
Pennsylvania argued that the state in which the debtor’s principal place of 
business is located should retain the exclusive right to escheat the unclaimed 
property.151  Finally, Florida argued that the right to escheat “should be 
accorded to the State of the creditor’s last known address as shown by the 
debtor’s books and records.”152 
 
 146 507 U.S. 490 (1993). 
 147 Texas, 379 U.S. at 675.  The unclaimed property in question primarily consisted of uncashed and 
unclaimed checks.  Id. at 675, 677 n.4.  Texas also sought a temporary injunction to enjoin the other 
contending states from escheating the property; however, this claim was dismissed when the states agreed to 
abstain from taking action until the case was resolved.  Id. at 677 n.5. 
 148 See id. at 676–77 (introducing Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida as the contending states 
and briefly describing each proposal).  Illinois had no interest in the instant property, but it sought to intervene 
to argue that the right to escheat “should depend on the laws of the State in which the indebtedness was 
created.”  Id. at 677 n.6.  However, Illinois’s motion to intervene was denied in an earlier proceeding.  
Miscellaneous Orders, 372 U.S. 973 (1963) (denying motion to intervene). 
 149 Texas, 379 U.S. at 678. 
 150 Id. at 679. 
 151 Id. at 680. 
 152 Id. at 680–81. 
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The Court then examined each of the tests in order.  First, the Court 
rejected the contacts test as unworkable, because it would lead to such 
“permanent turmoil” that any benefits a state might gain from escheat would 
be nullified by the litigation expenses created by the uncertainty of the test.153  
Second, although the Court found the debtor’s state of incorporation test 
compelling in its “clarity and ease of application,” it was hesitant to adopt a 
test that would elevate a “minor factor” (mere incorporation) for debts incurred 
across the country.154  Third, the Court found the principal place of business 
test persuasive since that state’s laws and economy substantially benefit the 
company responsible for the creation of the unclaimed property.155  However, 
the Court rejected this test because it would be “strange” to convert a liability 
of the debtor into an asset through escheat, and additionally, the case-by-case 
search for a business’s principal place of business would create too much 
uncertainty.156  Finally, the Court decided to adopt the last-known-address test 
because of its ability to balance fairness with clarity.157  Further, the last-
known-address test would ensure that escheats among the states would be 
distributed in proportion to “the commercial activities of their residents.”158 
Adopting the last-known-address test, however, left two unresolved 
scenarios: when the debtor’s records omit the creditor’s last known address, 
and when the state of last known address does not provide for escheat of the 
property.159  Therefore, as a matter of “ease of administration and of equity,” 
the Court devised a dual-pronged priority structure whereby the last-known-
address test takes primary priority.160  However, in the event that the first-
priority rule is inapplicable for either of the reasons just mentioned, the 
debtor’s state of incorporation test takes second priority.161 
 
 153 Id. at 678–79. 
 154 Id. at 680. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. at 680–82 (reasoning that this test incorporates fairness because “a debt is property of the 
creditor, not of the debtor,” and clarity because it presents “a factual issue simple and easy to resolve, and 
leaves no legal issue to be decided”). 
 158 Id. at 681. 
 159 Id. at 682.  Unfortunately, it is unclear whether a state’s unclaimed property law that explicitly 
exempts particular forms of property would fall within the latter scenario.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, § 2.05 
(“In this instance, perhaps, the holder is not required to report because, literally, the law of the state of last 
known address does provide for escheat, albeit not effectively.”). 
 160 See Texas, 379 U.S. at 682–83. 
 161 See id.  However, any state escheating property under the second-priority rule would retain it until 
some other state proves that it has a right to escheat the property under the first-priority rule, whether by 
determining the residence of the creditor or by enacting legislation to cover the property in question.  Id. 
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Importantly, the Court’s holding was not determined “by statutory or 
constitutional provisions or by past decisions, nor [was] it entirely one of 
logic.”162  Rather, the holding was premised on the belief that the dual-pronged 
priority structure was “the fairest, . . . easy to apply, and in the long run . . . the 
most generally acceptable to all the States.”163  Ironically, in subsequent cases, 
the Court’s reasoning for reaffirming the dual-priority structure relied on the 
precedential weight of Texas.  Although the rule is certainly easy to apply, its 
fairness and acceptability to all the states is doubtful in the gift card context, 
where a minority of states—primarily Delaware and New York, where most 
businesses are incorporated—benefit substantially.164 
2. Pennsylvania v. New York 
Eleven years after Western Union, Pennsylvania renewed its efforts to 
escheat the unclaimed money orders that were the subject of that case in 
Pennsylvania v. New York.165  Pennsylvania brought this original action against 
New York to determine which state had the right to escheat or take custody of 
the unclaimed money orders held by Western Union Telegraph Company.166  
Pennsylvania argued that in certain industries where the customary business 
practice is to omit from its records the address of the creditor, the state in 
which the transaction occurred should be permitted to escheat rather than the 
state in which the debtor is incorporated.167  Further, to hold otherwise would 
entitle the state of incorporation to a windfall, and thus the Texas rule would 
not be acceptable to all the states in this particular context.168  The Court 
recognized that there was some inconsistency between the underlying rationale 
in Texas and applying the second-priority rule here.169  However, it declined to 
carve out an exception to the bright-line rule that would “require [the] Court to 
 
 162 Id. at 683. 
 163 Id. (emphasis added). 
 164 See infra Part IV.A. 
 165 407 U.S. 206 (1972). 
 166 Id. at 207.  Connecticut, California, and Indiana joined as intervening plaintiffs, and New Jersey 
submitted an amicus brief supporting Pennsylvania’s position.  Id. at 207 nn.1–2.  Florida was an original 
defendant while Arizona joined as an intervening defendant.  Id.  Recall that the money orders were purchased 
in Pennsylvania and Western Union was incorporated in New York.  See supra Part III.A. 
 167 Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 213–14. 
 168 Id. at 214.  Pennsylvania also argued that the first-priority rule under Texas was merely a legal 
presumption that the creditor’s residence was actually in the state of her last known address.  Id.  Therefore, 
argued Pennsylvania, a similar presumption based on the state in which the transaction occurred is equally 
valid and should be given greater priority than the state of incorporation.  Id. 
 169 Id. 
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do precisely what [it] said should be avoided” by deciding a state’s right to 
escheat on a case-by-case basis.170 
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Blackmun and 
Rehnquist joined, arguing that the majority’s wooden application of the Texas 
rule “exalts the rule but derogates the reasons supporting it.”171  First, the 
rationale for relegating the debtor’s state of incorporation test to secondary 
priority in Texas was to avoid converting a debtor’s obligation into an asset 
and unnecessarily elevating the importance of a minor factor such as 
incorporation.172  However, the second-priority rule “would be impermissible 
as a basis for disposing of more than a small minority of the debts.”173 
Second, Justice Powell argued that the majority’s mechanical application of 
Texas failed to ensure that escheats among the states would be distributed in 
proportion to the commercial activities of their residents.174  Finally, the 
majority’s holding would require the exhaustive and expensive examination of 
all available money order applications in search of addresses, which would 
defeat the utility of the Texas rule.175 
Justice Powell then argued for the application of the transactional rule as a 
logical deviation from Texas, which would preserve the “equitable foundation” 
of Texas by preventing a windfall to New York, and would require more easily 
obtainable information regarding the state in which the transaction occurred.176  
Although Justice Powell’s argument did not win the day, it was likely the 
impetus for Congress stepping in two years later to supersede the majority’s 
holding in Pennsylvania. 
3. Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act 
Two years later, in response to Pennsylvania, Congress passed the 
Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act, which 
statutorily altered the dual-priority structure as applied to money orders and 
 
 170 Id. at 214–15.  Further, the Court noted that many of the creditors’ addresses were actually available in 
the retained records of money order applications—as opposed to the ledger records—and the availability of 
these addresses would diminish any windfall to New York.  Id. at 215. 
 171 Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 172 Id. at 218–19. 
 173 Id. at 219. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 219–20. 
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traveler’s checks.177  This Act replaced the first-priority rule from Texas with a 
place-of-purchase test, which accords the right to escheat any unclaimed funds 
to the state in which the money order or traveler’s check was purchased as 
designated in the business’s records.178  If the records do not indicate the state 
of purchase, or if the state of purchase’s unclaimed property laws do not 
provide for escheat or custodial taking of the unclaimed property, then the right 
to escheat is accorded to the state in which the debtor’s principal place of 
business is located.179 
4. Delaware v. New York 
In Delaware v. New York,180 the Court was presented with another 
opportunity to refine the dual-priority structure of the Texas rule but declined 
to do so.181  The unclaimed property in dispute primarily consisted of 
unclaimed dividends, interest, and other distributions made by issuers of 
securities, which the issuers had transferred to intermediaries such as banks, 
depositories, and brokers.182  Between 1985 and 1989, New York had taken 
custody of $360 million in funds held by intermediaries doing business in New 
York, regardless of the last known addresses of beneficial owners or the 
intermediaries’ state of incorporation.183  Delaware brought this original action, 
arguing that the securities had been wrongfully escheated by New York.184 
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court adhered to the dual-priority 
rules from Texas and concluded that unclaimed securities distributions held by 
intermediaries for unidentifiable beneficial owners185 escheat to the state in 
which the intermediary is incorporated.186  First, the Court “determine[d] the 
 
 177 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501–2503 (2006). 
 178 Id. § 2503(1). 
 179 Id. § 2503(2)–(3). 
 180 507 U.S. 490 (1993). 
 181 See id. at 494. 
 182 Id. at 495.  The intermediaries would hold the securities in their own names, as opposed to the 
beneficial owners’ names.  Id.  For a brief discussion of the relevant issues regarding the nature of the 
securities system, see generally Wolfe, supra note 3, at 178–88. 
 183 Delaware, 507 U.S. at 496.  The dormancy period was three years as prescribed by the New York 
Abandoned Property Law, whereas Delaware’s unclaimed property laws prescribed a dormancy period of five 
to seven years.  Hall, supra note 139, at 95.  New York’s law was likely an attempt by the state to avoid the 
issues presented by Texas before other states attempted to escheat the funds.  Id. at 95–96. 
 184 Delaware, 507 U.S. at 496–97. 
 185 Id. at 500 (“The bulk of the abandoned distributions at issue, however, cannot be traced to any 
identifiable beneficial owner, much less one with a last known address.”). 
 186 Id. at 494. 
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precise debtor-creditor relationship”187 by identifying the intermediaries as the 
appropriate debtor “because they alone . . . [were] legally obligated to deliver 
unclaimed securities distributions to the beneficial owners,”188 and by 
identifying the registered shareholders as the relevant creditors because they 
were the parties contractually owed the unclaimed securities distributions.189 
Next, the Court applied the secondary rule because the identities—let alone 
the last known addresses—of the beneficial owners were unknown, and the 
Court reaffirmed that the secondary rule exclusively accords the right to 
escheat to the state of the debtor’s incorporation.190  Strict adherence to Texas 
and Pennsylvania was dictated by “[p]recedent, efficiency, and equity.”191  
Although the Court mentioned equity as part of its rationale, adherence to 
precedent was now more important than ensuring that the rule led to equitable 
results.  Any inequitable gaps that the Texas rule failed to account for were left 
in the hands of Congress to remedy.  The Court advocated that states may 
always “air their grievances before Congress” to obtain specific legislation just 
as was done after Pennsylvania with the passage of the Disposition of 
Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act.192  Finally, the Court 
 
 187 Id. at 499. 
 188 Id. at 504–05.  The Court declined to follow the Special Master’s recommendation that the relevant 
debtors were the issuers—an argument proposed by Texas and other intervening states—because the issuers 
had extinguished any and all contractual liabilities upon transfer of the distributions to the intermediaries.  See 
id. 
 189 Id. at 508.  The Court rejected New York’s argument that the relevant creditors were other 
intermediary brokers who had purchased the underlying securities.  Id. 
 190 Id. at 505–07.  Here, the Court declined to follow the Special Master’s sua sponte recommendation 
that the secondary rule should grant the right to escheat unclaimed securities to the state in which the debtor’s 
principal executive offices are located.  Id. at 505–06.  The Special Master reasoned that strict adherence to the 
state of incorporation standard would inequitably grant a windfall to Delaware, whereas a principal executive 
office standard would more evenly distribute the unclaimed funds.  Id. at 507.  However, since the Court 
identified the relevant debtors as the intermediaries, whose principal executive offices were primarily located 
in New York, the proposed standard would merely shift the windfall to another state and would needlessly 
complicate the desirable simplicity and efficiency of the secondary rule under Texas.  Id. at 506–07. 
The Court also rejected New York’s argument that the primary rule should be augmented by utilizing 
statistical sampling instead of the debtor’s records to locate creditors’ last known addresses.  Id. at 508–09.  
The Court quickly dismissed this argument, which was “practically identical” to Pennsylvania’s proposed 
place-of-purchase standard in Pennsylvania.  Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 214 (1972)). 
 191 Id. at 507.  Although the Texas Court acknowledged that the interstate dispute issue is not controlled 
by past decisions, Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965), the Delaware Court reasoned that 
adherence to precedent was necessary to preserve efficiency and equity, 507 U.S. at 510. 
 192 Delaware, 507 U.S. at 510 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501–2503 (2006)).  In fact, the majority of states 
decided to air their grievances within less than a year, when the Equitable Escheatment Act of 1993 was 
introduced into Congress.  See H.R. 2443, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1715, 103d Cong. (1993).  This Bill, if 
passed, would have altered the secondary rule and introduced a third-priority rule regarding unclaimed 
distributions paid on securities.  See H.R. 2443, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1715, 103d Cong. (1993). 
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noted that the Texas rule was federal common law, which would preempt any 
state laws that “prescribe a different priority” structure.193  This is particularly 
significant because it means that states lack the power to exempt gift cards, or 
any other forms of unclaimed property, if the Texas rule would entitle another 
state to claim that property.194 
C. Summary 
The past sixty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence reflect a departure 
from determining the scope of unclaimed property laws to outlining which 
states have the exclusive right to escheat unclaimed property.  Ultimately, the 
Court devised a rule that was—in theory—both efficient in its administration 
and equitable to all the states.  However, as particular situations arose that 
yielded inequitable results under the Texas rule, the Court continuously upheld 
its rule by emphasizing efficiency over equity.  The Court has effectively 
washed its hands of any case-specific inadequacies by deferring to Congress as 
the appropriate outlet for remedying such inequitable results. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION: WHY THE DUAL-PRIORITY 
STRUCTURE IS UNSUITABLE FOR GIFT CARDS 
This Part argues that the Texas dual-priority structure is wholly inadequate 
in the context of gift cards.  Section A argues that the Texas rule necessarily 
collapses into a single rule for gift cards and inequitably benefits a minority of 
states, particularly Delaware and New York.  Additionally, it concludes that 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to revisit interstate conflicts of escheat laws, 
despite gift cards presenting the ideal context for carving out an exception to 
the Court’s bright-line rule.  Sections B and C analyze the other two possible 
outlets for reform—the states and Congress, respectively.  Section B argues 
that although it would seem states are in the best position to resolve an area 
traditionally relegated to their sovereignty, the Texas rule preempts any state 
attempts to create a uniform and equitable rule.  Section C concludes that 
Congress is the only viable avenue for providing an equitable solution. 
 
 193 See Delaware, 507 U.S. at 500 (“[N]o State may supersede [the Texas rule] by purporting to prescribe 
a different priority under state law.”). 
 194 See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. And Then There Was One: The Collapse of the Dual-Priority Rule 
Under the Texas rule, the primary rule of last known address will never be 
satisfied in the gift card context.  Even in the unlikely situation that a business 
retains records of a gift card purchaser’s last known address, the purchaser is 
not the owner.195  Instead, the owner is the subsequent recipient of the gift 
card.196 
Consequently, the dual-priority structure collapses into a single rule for gift 
cards, so that the state of the holder’s incorporation will always have the power 
to escheat the breakage as long as it has legislation covering gift cards.197  This 
means that Delaware, which is the state of incorporation for more than half of 
publicly traded companies,198 is the primary recipient of unclaimed gift card 
revenue.  In fact, unclaimed property accounts for Delaware’s third largest 
source of revenue.199  Therefore, a strict application of the dual-priority 
structure ensures a windfall to Delaware, which contradicts the rationale for a 
rule that is “most generally acceptable to all the States.”200 
In Pennsylvania v. New York, Justice Powell argued in his dissent that the 
Texas rule should not be woodenly applied to situations that would elevate the 
incidental factor of incorporation to an impermissible degree,201 particularly 
when its rigid application would arbitrarily and inequitably bestow a single 
state with a “windfall.”202  The majority dismissed Justice Powell’s windfall 
argument because the money order applications included records of the 
owners’ last known addresses, so the dual-priority rule would not necessarily 
collapse into the secondary rule of incorporation.203  However, Justice Powell’s 
argument is far more convincing in the gift card context where the last known 
addresses of gift card owners are necessarily unavailable.204  In this case, it is 
 
 195 See NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 15–16 (“[M]ost gift cards are given 
to another person . . . .”). 
 196 Id. 
 197 See id. at 16.
 
 198 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553–54 (2002). 
 199 See Minutes of the Delaware Economic & Financial Advisory Council, DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., 4 tbl. (June 
15, 2009), http://finance.delaware.gov/defac/min_0609.pdf. 
 200 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965). 
 201 Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 218–19 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 202 See id. at 220. 
 203 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 204 As discussed above in Part II.A, states could require businesses to obtain owners’ personal 
information; however, this would not present an ideal solution due to consumer privacy concerns. 
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difficult to deny that a minority of states will be entitled to the majority of 
unclaimed gift card revenue. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the efficiency of a 
bright-line rule is, in its estimation, preferable to equitable results.  Therefore, 
the Court is not the appropriate branch for tailoring the dual-priority structure 
to gift cards. 
B. Preemption of States’ Attempts to Carve in Additional Priority Rules 
This section addresses attempts by individual states to carve in a tertiary 
rule based on the state in which the transaction occurred.  This third-priority 
rule would take effect when neither the primary nor the secondary rule 
identifies a particular state.  However, it is unclear whether the Texas rule, 
which is federal common law, would preempt states from enforcing additional 
rules of priority.  This uncertainty amplifies the risks of compliance for 
businesses that have incorporated in states that exempt gift cards from their 
unclaimed property laws.  On the one hand, if the third-priority rule is 
enforceable, then such businesses would be required to report gift card 
breakage to states in which the gift card was purchased.  On the other hand, if 
the third-priority rule is preempted, then the business may retain the breakage.  
This section concludes that because the dual-priority structure is federal 
common law, any state’s attempt to create additional priority rules is likely 
preempted.  Therefore, the only viable solution that remains depends on 
congressional action. 
1. The 1981 and 1995 Uniform Acts 
Both the 1981 Act and the 1995 Act incorporate the priority rules as 
declared in Texas.205  The 1995 Act also incorporates the Disposition of 
Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act.206  However, the Acts 
include an additional provision, which creates a third-priority rule enabling the 
state in which the formative transaction occurred to escheat the intangible 
property when the primary and secondary rules would not apply.207  In other 
words, the proposed tertiary rule unearths the contacts test that was rejected in 
 
 205 See 1981 UNIF. ACT, supra note 75, § 3(1), (3), 8C U.L.A. at 189; 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, 
§ 4(1), (3), 8C U.L.A. at 111, 112. 
 206 See 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 4(7), 8C U.L.A. at 112. 
 207 Id. § 4(6), 8C U.L.A. at 112; 1981 UNIF. ACT, supra note 75, § 3(6), 8C U.L.A. at 189.  Of course, a 
state asserting custody under this rule would retain the unclaimed property, subject to any state with a greater 
claim under the primary or secondary rules. 
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Texas.  The rationale for including this provision is that when neither of the 
Texas priority claims apply, but another “[s]tate has a genuine and important 
contact with the property,” that state should be entitled to escheat the property 
to avoid a windfall to the private debtor.208 
However, the legitimacy of creating rules of priority beyond the dual-
priority structure construed in Texas remains questionable at best, particularly 
given the holding in Texas was intended to settle the issue of conflicting state 
claims “once and for all by a clear rule.”209  Further, many states have 
expressly omitted or exempted particular forms of intangible property from 
their unclaimed property laws210 to attract businesses to incorporate in their 
state.  Allowing other states to claim these forms of property would nullify the 
intent of such exemptions. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Texas 
dual-priority structure preempts the construction of additional, but not 
necessarily conflicting, priority rules.211 
2. A Split in the Caselaw Increases the Risk of Compliance 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address whether the dual-priority 
structure preempts state laws from devising additional priority rules, the lower 
courts have confronted the issue to a limited degree with varying results.  The 
risks of compliance for businesses implementing gift cards are already too 
great,212 and the questionable enforceability of a third-priority rule will only 
increase these risks. 
The argument supporting the validity of a tertiary rule is that the dual-
priority structure devised in Texas relates only to disputes between states, and 
 
 208 1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 4 cmt., 8C U.L.A. at 113; see also NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID 
CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that an objective of the Uniform Acts was the prevention of an unjust 
windfall to property holders).  The comment to the 1995 Act expressly indicates that the third-priority rule 
applies to gift certificates when there is no last known address and when the state of incorporation does not 
have an abandoned property law covering gift certificates.  1995 UNIF. ACT, supra note 12, § 4 cmt., 8C 
U.L.A. at 114. 
 209 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965). 
 210 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-301(15) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-28-201(13)(B)(i) (2009); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-73a(e) (2008); IND. CODE § 32-34-1-1(f) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 17-
101(m) (LexisNexis 2010); cf. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 507 (1993) (“When the creditor’s State 
cannot assert its predominant interest, we detect no inequity in rewarding a State whose laws prove more 
attractive to firms that wish to incorporate.”). 
 211 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § V(B)(1). 
 212 See supra Part II.C. 
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therefore, Texas does not prohibit a state from taking custody of property based 
on a tertiary rule as long as that state is capable of protecting the holder from 
multiple liability.213  Conversely, other courts have supported the conclusion 
that the dual-priority structure preempts any state laws that would attempt to 
expand the available rules of priority.214  In American Petrofina Co. v. 
Nance,215 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held 
that federal common law, developed to resolve disputes between states, may be 
applied to suits between private litigants.216  More recently, in 2010, the U.S. 
District Court for New Jersey granted a preliminary injunction enjoining New 
Jersey from enforcing its place-of-purchase presumption because there was a 
reasonable probability that federal common law preempts the statutory attempt 
to create a new rule of priority.217 
 
 213 See, e.g., State v. Chubb Corp., 570 A.2d 1313, 1315–16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989) (“Nothing in 
Texas v. New Jersey . . . prohibits a state from claiming custodial escheat of property based on the locale of the 
transaction or the place of business of the holder being in that state.”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Okla. Corp. 
Comm’n, 829 P.2d 964, 971 (Okla. 1992) (“In Texas the Court was not confronted with, nor did it decide, the 
rights to custody of abandoned property as between a private holder and a State. . . .  Nothing in Texas 
prohibits a state from claiming temporary custody of unclaimed property until some other state comes forward 
with proof that it has a superior right to it.”); O’Connor v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 379 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 412 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1980). 
 214 See Am. Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 697 F. Supp. 1183, 1187–88 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding that state 
laws are preempted to the extent they conflict with federal common law, particularly when devised for the 
purpose of national uniformity), aff’d, 859 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 1187 (“The rules of federal common law developed in resolving disputes between states have 
been applied not only to suits between states but to suits between private litigants as well.”). 
 217 Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, No. 4890 (FLW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120153 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2010), clarified sub nom. N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, No. 10-
5059 (FLW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3911 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2011).  The statute in question was N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:30B-42.1(c) (West 2010), which provided that if the issuer did not have the purchaser’s or owner’s name 
and address, then that address would be deemed to be the same address as the place where the card was 
purchased.  Am. Express, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120153, at *107–08.  The State argued that “it may create a 
‘third priority rule’ under which it temporarily holds the property until the creditor’s address becomes apparent 
and the creditor’s state asserts its superior right to escheat.”  Id. at *128. 
The court acknowledged the cases cited above in note 213, but went on to argue that their underlying 
rationale could “not withstand more careful examination,” id. at *129, and concluded that “there is no room for 
a third priority position[;] . . . [i]f the secondary-rule state does not escheat, the buck stops there,” id. at *133.  
The court’s preemption analysis relied on the language in Delaware v. New York that “no State may supersede 
[Texas and Pennsylvania] by purporting to prescribe a different priority under state law.”  Id. at *134 (quoting 
Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 500 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, the Supreme 
Court had considered multiple possible schemes, of which it selected only one, which implied that the Court 
intended the dual-priority structure to remain precisely that.  Id. at *135.  To allow states to create any number 
of new rules of priority would defeat the ease of administration for which the Court selected its bright-line 
rule.  Id. at *136. 
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Given the Supreme Court’s repeated strict adherence to the dual-priority 
structure set out in Texas because of its ease in application,218 and the Court’s 
rejection of a contacts test that would create “permanent turmoil” on an issue 
in need of national uniformity,219 the reasoning of the Nance and American 
Express courts is far more compelling220 than the desire to prevent holders 
from receiving a windfall under any and all circumstances.  Both potential 
holders and state legislatures, which have enacted express exemptions in their 
unclaimed property laws, have relied on the Texas rule over the past four 
decades.  Muddying the waters with potentially unlimited additional priority 
rules among the states would re-create the very problem that the Texas Court 
set out to resolve. 
Businesses implementing gift cards are subjected to further uncertainty by 
attempts of states to carve in a tertiary transactional rule.  For example, many 
businesses create a subsidiary entity specifically to manage gift card programs 
and to act as an intermediary holder, while the parent business acts as the agent 
of the subsidiary in the sale of gift cards.221  The subsidiary incorporates in a 
state that has exempted gift cards from its escheat laws.222  However, a state 
that has adopted the 1995 Act would purportedly enable that state to assert a 
claim against the special-purpose subsidiary despite the state of incorporation’s 
explicit exemption.223  The legitimacy of state attempts to create additional 
rules of priority remains unclear224 and only heightens the uncertainty and 
corresponding risk of noncompliance for businesses employing gift cards.225  
Consequently, the only outlet for creating or refining the rules of priority will 
depend on congressional action. 
C. Congressional Action Is Appropriate 
Sections A and B argued that neither the Supreme Court nor the states are 
well equipped to resolve issues of gift cards under the current system of 
 
 218 See Delaware, 507 U.S. at 506, 507; Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 211, 215 (1972); Texas 
v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965). 
 219 Texas, 379 U.S. at 678. 
 220 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cases on point have a clear dividing line: state courts have dismissed 
preemption claims whereas the cases striking down states’ attempts have been adjudicated in federal district 
courts. 
 221 John A. Biek, Unredeemed Gift Cards and Stored Value Cards Present Unclaimed Property and 
Income Tax Issues, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 13, 16. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Houghton et al., supra note 43, § V(B). 
 224 See supra Part IV.B. 
 225 See supra Part II.C. 
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unclaimed property laws.  The current system provides a windfall to a minority 
of states and creates greater uncertainty that entails increased risks of 
compliance.  This section argues that Congress has the power to enact 
legislation specifically addressing gift cards, not only in the context of 
interstate disputes but also regarding intrastate substantive provisions of 
unclaimed property laws. 
Congress clearly has the power to enact legislation regarding interstate 
conflicts.  The Supreme Court expressly invited congressional action in 
Delaware v. New York.226  Further, Congress has already enacted specific 
legislation regarding interstate disputes of money orders and traveler’s checks 
when it passed the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s 
Checks Act.227 
Although unclaimed property laws have traditionally been classified as a 
state power, Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause228 to enact 
legislation that specifically addresses substantive provisions regarding the 
escheat of gift cards.  For example, Congress has expressly preempted state 
escheat laws regarding veterans’ property229 as well as income tax refunds.230  
Congress’s recent enactment of the Credit CARD Act of 2009 specifically 
addresses consumer protection laws regarding gift cards.231  Consequently, 
Congress has the power to statutorily alter the priority structure as applied to 
gift cards.  More significantly, it has the power to enact a national exemption 
of gift cards from state escheat laws. 
V. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CREATE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR GIFT 
CARDS 
This Part argues that congressional exemption of gift cards from escheat 
laws is the best practical solution for resolving the intrastate and interstate 
problems that are applicable in the gift card context.  Section A argues that a 
 
 226 Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993). 
 227 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 228 See Wolfe, supra note 3, at 218. 
 229 See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (recognizing the validity of 38 U.S.C. § 17 (1952) 
(current version at 38 U.S.C. § 8520 (2006)), a federal escheat statute regarding veterans’ property). 
 230 See 26 U.S.C. § 6408 (2006). 
 231 See Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Unfortunately, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 is generally silent on the issue of escheat, 
see 15 U.S.C. § 1693q (Supp. III 2009), and the regulations defer to the Federal Reserve Board to determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether a state statute is preempted by the Act, see 12 C.F.R. § 205.12(b) (2010). 
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national exemption of gift cards from escheat laws properly resolves the 
intrastate conflicts between holders and a given state, and conforms to the 
general trend of states to exempt gift cards from their escheat laws.  Section B 
argues that this exemption will remove gift cards from a dual-priority scheme 
that is not equipped to encompass them.  Finally, section C argues that a gift 
card exemption will incentivize further innovation in a rapidly developing 
industry and increase national and global competition. 
A. Resolution of Intrastate Conflicts 
The traditional justifications for escheat do not apply to gift cards and, 
therefore, exempting gift cards appropriately removes them from the subject 
matter of laws that were never intended to include them.  States lack the ability 
to reunite owners with the unclaimed breakage because owners’ identities are 
necessarily anonymous.232  If anything, businesses are better positioned to 
reunite owners with their unclaimed property through optional registration 
programs that enable the owner to reclaim the funds in the event of loss, 
instead of through inconvenient state escheat procedures.233  Allowing 
businesses to retain the breakage enables them to pass on the savings to a 
closely tailored subgroup that is more likely to encompass the purchasers and 
owners of gift cards.234 
Exempting gift cards ensures that state escheat laws do not violate the 
derivative rights doctrine by granting a greater right in the state than the 
owners ever had.235  A national exemption would eliminate the need for courts 
to resolve whether the limited right to merchandise is a condition that would be 
unreasonable for a state to satisfy.236 
Most significantly, exempting gift cards from escheat laws substantially 
reduces the needless risks of compliance that businesses are subjected to in 
navigating through a multiplicity of states with variant, ambiguous, and 
antiquated legislation.237  The market for gift cards has expanded to a national 
level that requires uniformity.238  Even if many states were to independently 
 
 232 See supra Part II.A. 
 233 See supra Part II.A. 
 234 See supra Part II.A. 
 235 See supra Part II.B. 
 236 See supra Part II.B. 
 237 See supra Part II.C. 
 238 See supra Part II.C. 
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update their legislation, the risk of nonuniformity would still remain.239  A 
congressional exemption properly recognizes the unique characteristics of gift 
cards. 
B. Resolution of Interstate Conflicts 
The Supreme Court’s dual-priority structure falls incredibly short in 
accounting for gift cards because the structure necessarily collapses into a 
single rule based on the incidental factor of a business’s state of 
incorporation.240  This entails that a minority of states receive the majority of 
unclaimed gift card revenue.241  This result is completely at odds with notions 
of equity among the states.242 
Although a blanket exemption might first appear to offer equality among 
the states by merely removing the benefit altogether, it is important to note 
three things.  First, the majority of states presently receives little to no benefit 
from the state of incorporation rule.  Short of obtaining a congressionally 
sanctioned compact, these states lack the power to alter the dual-priority 
structure.243  In fact, even if every state except for Delaware exempted gift 
cards from their escheat laws, the distribution of unclaimed gift card revenue 
would not substantially differ from the current system. 
Second, a national exemption would actually benefit many states that 
receive little benefit under the present rule.  Any breakage that a business 
retains as revenue would be subject to state taxes in any states with which that 
business has a sufficient connection. 
Finally, more than half the states presently exempt gift cards to some extent 
for many of the reasons already mentioned.  The dual-priority structure 
undermines the intent of these states by enabling other states to escheat gift 
cards that would otherwise be exempt.  This concern is even greater if the 
third-priority rule is not preempted by Texas v. New Jersey.  In this case, even 
businesses incorporated in states that exempt gift cards are at risk of other 
states claiming a right to escheat.244  A blanket exemption avoids this conflict 
 
 239 See supra Part II.C. 
 240 See supra Part IV.A. 
 241 See supra Part IV.A. 
 242 See supra Part IV.A. 
 243 See supra Part IV.B. 
 244 See supra Part IV.B. 
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and conforms to the general trend of the states to escheat gift cards from their 
unclaimed property laws. 
C. Incentives for Innovation 
Currently, the United States is the leader in the development of prepaid 
cards.245  However, expansive unclaimed property legislation—particularly 
when ambiguous and varying substantially from one state to the next—will 
lead to two consequences.  First, as the United States expands prepaid and gift 
cards to an international market, it will face increased competition from other 
countries, in which retailers do not lose gift card breakage.246  However, if 
Congress passes a national exemption of gift cards, American businesses will 
be able to compete globally on an even playing field.  This exemption would 
incentivize companies to continue to improve current systems. 
Second, when otherwise anticipated profits are captured by states, those 
costs are passed on to the consumers.247  Creating and managing a system of 
gift cards includes transactional costs for the business.  These costs are likely 
to be passed on to consumers in some fashion, whether by increasing the retail 
price of goods or including fees on gift cards.  However, a blanket exemption 
would enable a business to account for these transactional costs through the 
retained breakage and would likely have the opposite effect of reducing the 
retail price of goods. 
The market for gift cards has risen to a national level and requires uniform 
legislation.  States have become more aggressive in their search for nontax 
revenue to the point that they have enacted legislation to grab unclaimed funds 
from businesses incorporated in states with business-friendly unclaimed 
property laws.248  A federal exemption to the escheat of gift cards would 
provide businesses with incentives to further develop gift card technology and 
would provide consumers with lower costs and increased convenience. 
CONCLUSION 
Gift cards present unique issues for current unclaimed property laws, such 
as the inability of states to reunite owners with their property, special 
 
 245 NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASS’N, supra note 56, at 18. 
 246 Id. at 19. 
 247 Id. 
 248 See supra Part IV.B. 
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considerations under the derivative rights doctrine, and impractical 
uncertainties of how to apply current laws that were not designed to anticipate 
issues particular to gift cards.  These reasons tend to justify the recent trend by 
many states to exempt gift cards from their unclaimed property laws. 
However, as long as some states continue to escheat gift card breakage, 
these problems will continue to manifest themselves, even when the states in 
which the cards are purchased, sold, and used explicitly exempt gift cards from 
their escheat laws.  This result is primarily due to the Supreme Court’s strict 
adherence to the bright-line dual-priority structure, which enables a minority of 
states, in which a majority of businesses are incorporated, to capture gift card 
breakage. 
Congress should accept the invitation of the Supreme Court to enact 
specific legislation regarding issues like those presented by the nuances of gift 
cards.  Federal legislation should exempt gift cards from unclaimed property 
laws because gift cards are not an appropriate subject matter of escheat and 
because gift cards do not fit in the priority scheme of escheat among the states.  
A blanket congressional exemption of gift cards resolves these difficulties and 
increases the incentives for development in a rapidly growing national 
industry. 
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